Science fiction likes to depict robots as autonomous machines, capable of making their own decisions and often expressing their own personalities. Yet we also tend to think of robots as property, and as lacking the kind of rights that we reserve for people.<\/p>\n
But if a machine can think, decide and act on its own volition, if it can be harmed or held responsible for its actions, should we stop treating it like property and start treating it more like a person with rights?<\/p>\n
What if a robot achieves true self-awareness? Should it have equal rights with us and the same protection under the law, or at least something similar?<\/p>\n
These are some of the issues being discussed by the European Parliament\u2019s Committee on Legal Affairs. Last year it released a draft report and motion<\/a> calling for a set of civil law rules on robotics regulating their manufacture, use, autonomy and impact upon society.<\/p>\n Of the legal solutions proposed, perhaps most interesting was the suggestion of creating a legal status of \u201celectronic persons\u201d for the most sophisticated robots.<\/p>\n The report acknowledged that improvements in the autonomous and cognitive abilities of robots makes them more than simple tools, and makes ordinary rules on liability, such as contractual and tort liability, insufficient for handling them.<\/p>\n For example, the current EU directive<\/a> on liability for harm by robots only covers foreseeable damage caused by manufacturing defects. In these cases, the manufacturer is responsible. However, when robots are able to learn and adapt to their environment in unpredictable ways, it\u2019s harder for a manufacturer to foresee problems that could cause harm.<\/p>\n The report also questions about whether or not sufficiently sophisticated robots should be regarded as natural persons, legal persons (like corporations), animals or objects. Rather than lumping them into an existing category, it proposes that a new category of \u201celectronic person\u201d is more appropriate.<\/p>\n The report does not advocate immediate legislative action, though. Instead it proposes that legislation be updated if robots become more complex; if and when they develop more behavioural sophistication. If this occurs, one recommendation is to reduce the liability of \u201ccreators\u201d proportional to the autonomy of the robot, and that a compulsory \u201cno-fault\u201d liability insurance could cover the shortfall.<\/p>\n But why go so far as to create a new category of \u201celectronic persons\u201d? After all, computers still have a long way to go<\/a> before they match human intelligence, if they ever do.<\/p>\n But it can be agreed that robots \u2013 or more precisely the software that controls them \u2013 is becoming increasingly complex. Autonomous (or \u201cemergent<\/a>\u201d) machines are becoming more common. There are ongoing discussions about the legal liability for autonomous vehicles,<\/a> or whether we might be able to sue robotic surgeons<\/a>.<\/p>\n These are not complicated problems as long as liability rests with the manufacturers. But what if manufacturers cannot be easily identified<\/a>, such as if open source software<\/a> is used by autonomous vehicles? Whom do you sue when there are millions of \u201ccreators\u201d all over the world?<\/p>\n Artificial intelligence is also starting to live up to its moniker. Alan Turing<\/a>, the father of modern computing, proposed a test<\/a> in which a computer is considered \u201cintelligent\u201d if it fools humans into believing that the computer is human by its responses to questions. Already there are machines that are getting close<\/a> to passing this test.<\/p>\nApproaching personhood<\/h3>\n