{"id":748582,"date":"2024-02-05T11:00:12","date_gmt":"2024-02-05T09:00:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/businesstech.co.za\/news\/?p=748582"},"modified":"2024-02-05T11:01:22","modified_gmt":"2024-02-05T09:01:22","slug":"falling-apart-sa-armys-30-years-of-decline","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/businesstech.co.za\/news\/trending\/748582\/falling-apart-sa-armys-30-years-of-decline\/","title":{"rendered":"Falling apart – SA army’s 30 years of decline"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The South African National Defence Force marks 30 years this year, having been established on 27 April 1994<\/a>. It\u2019s as old as the country\u2019s constitutional democracy<\/a>, the result of a negotiated political settlement that ended apartheid. The defence force<\/a> consists of the army<\/a>, air force<\/a>, navy<\/a>, and military health service<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s\u00a0an amalgamation<\/a>\u00a0of the former apartheid-era South African Defence Force, the militaries of the former nominally independent Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei and Venda, and the former liberation armies of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s currently\u00a0ranked third<\/a>\u00a0in Africa, after Egypt and Algeria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where does the defence force find itself after three decades? How does it measure up to its mandate<\/a> of defending the country against external aggression, promoting security externally and internally, and supporting the population and government as needed?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The defence force has been expected to safeguard the country against external threats while simultaneously responding to political calls to assist with\u00a0peace and security operations<\/a>\u00a0in other African countries. It has also been called on to support the South African Police Service in\u00a0policing<\/a>\u00a0a\u00a0crime-ridden<\/a>\u00a0society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A mismatch has developed between what is expected of the military, and its budget and capabilities. Its budget declined to about 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the past decade. This is far too low compared to global average military spending of 2.2% of GDP<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a researcher who has studied the defence force as a foreign policy instrument for almost three decades, I\u2019m not surprised it is often described as \u201cinstitutionally overstretched\u201d<\/a>. It has been in decline for some time, especially since 2000, as its budgetary allocation<\/a> from treasury has shrunk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Figuring out its primary role<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government\u2019s policies after 1994 committed the defence force primarily to safeguarding the country\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The purchasing of new military equipment was based on the South African Defence Review of 1998<\/a>. The review elaborated on the 1996 White Paper for Defence<\/a> on such matters as posture, doctrine, force design, force levels, logistical support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This White Paper stipulated that the force design should be a high-technology core force, sized for peacetime, but expandable to meet any emerging threat. To this end, cabinet decided in November 1998 to buy new military equipment<\/a>. This was the infamous arms deal, mired in corruption<\/a>. The equipment included nine Gripen fighter aircraft, 12 Hawk aircraft, 30 light utility helicopters, four patrol corvettes and three submarines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critics<\/a> felt that the corvettes, submarines and Gripen jet fighters could be regarded as offensive weapons. That would not align with South Africa\u2019s foreign policy, specifically pertaining to participation in international peace missions<\/a> with the emphasis on cooperative defence and regional peacekeeping.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was eventually decided that the defence force should be designed primarily to protect the country from external enemies<\/a>. It would also promote peace and security in Africa, as secondary functions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Things have not quite panned out that way. Since 1998, the defence force has featured prominently as an instrument in South Africa\u2019s foreign policy. Its so-called secondary functions have become the primary function<\/a>. But it has received no additional armour and personnel for this additional role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The post-1994 government sought to rid the country of its apartheid-era image of being a pariah and a destabilising factor<\/a> in its neighbourhood. Instead, it was to be identified with the promotion of human rights, peace and development<\/a> in Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The force became the fifth largest troop-contributing nation<\/a> to the UN\u2019s peacekeeping operation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It also plays a pivotal role<\/a> in the Southern African Development Community mission in conflict-ridden northern Mozambique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It has been in the DRC since 1999<\/a>. This UN mission will now be terminated after more than 24 years<\/a>, and be replaced by troops from the Southern African Development Community, led by the South African National Defence Force<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But soldiers in the field haven\u2019t always received good logistical support<\/a>, especially in Mozambique. And poor coordination with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation has sometimes left the country embarrassed<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among other peacekeeping missions, since 1994 the defence force has also been deployed to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n